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POINT

The Case Against
the Arbitration
Fairness Act

By Peter B. Rutledge

T

he Arbitration Fairness Act is a well-intended but
ultimately misguided attempt to address a system of
dispute resolution that has largely worked well. The
bill currently being considered by Congress rests on a series
of flawed empirical premises. This article addresses three.
First, though the bill posits that arbitration leaves consumers
and employees worse off, data demonstrate individuals overall are often better off under a system with enforceable predispute arbitration agreements than a system without them.
Second, although the bill promises improved access to justice, the proposal actually erects more impediments. Third,
though the bill suggests that postdispute arbitration will provide a continued outlet for this system of dispute resolution,
it fails to recognize the significant structural impediments to
a successful system of postdispute arbitration.
First, it now appears to be common ground that the
policy debate over the Arbitration Fairness Act should
focus on empirical data. We all can harness our success
stories and horror stories about arbitration (or any other
system of dispute resolution). Yet the Arbitration Fairness
Act does not simply address the bad cases while preserving the good. Instead, it proposes a systemic overhaul that
categorically bans predispute agreements entirely. Thus,
to assess the bill’s impact, a systematic view of the empirical data is appropriate.
Interestingly, the data frequently show that predispute
arbitration in general produces better outcomes for individuals. In March, the Searle Institute of Northwestern
University Law School published a thorough study
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of consumer arbitrations conducted by the American
Arbitration Association. Contrary to the cries of arbitration’s critics, individuals fared quite well, prevailing in a
significant number of arbitrations and recovering a reasonable share of the damages that they sought. This study
represents simply the latest chapter in a growing body
of empirical literature suggesting that arbitration largely reaches a fair result for individuals in their disputes
against companies.1
To be sure, not all studies are as sanguine. Some
research suggests that low-income individuals in arbitrations under promulgated (as opposed to individually negotiated) arbitration agreements fare poorly.2 Such results,
though, simply beg the question about what causes such
outcomes. Is it that arbitration is stacked against the individual? Or something in the nature of the claim that gives
rise to a low likelihood of success, whether in arbitration,
litigation, or some other forum?
Not only are the data mixed, but they are also incomplete. Although the Arbitration Fairness Act broadly
addresses employment, consumer, and franchise arbitration, gaps exist in all three areas, especially franchise
arbitration, in which few studies are available and almost
none address outcomes.
The upshot here is simply that Congress should tread
cautiously when contemplating a systematic overhaul of a
system that, by some measures, produces favorable results
and, in other important respects, has an incomplete
empirical record.
Second, eliminating predispute arbitration agreements
impedes rather than improves an individual’s access to
justice. For one thing, individuals may find it more difficult
to find a lawyer if they are forced to litigate their claims.
The high costs of our civil litigation system mean that
(continued on page 7)
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to agree to a process that was truly better and more efficient for all.
In the end, the most practical way to ensure that
arbitration is fair is to make it voluntary on a postdispute
basis. Once a dispute has arisen, consumers, employees,
and other “little guys” will be able to make knowledgeable determinations as to whether the proposed arbitration is efficient and fair for all concerned. The proposed
Arbitration Fairness Act in this sense would use the free
market to ensure that arbitration is fair and just. u
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(continued from page 4)
lawyers generally will demand high recoveries and a high
prospect of success before they are willing to undertake a
case. By contrast, the lower costs of arbitration and the
procedural flexibility enable an individual to obtain judgment at a lower cost.
Apart from access to counsel, arbitration improves
access to justice in another respect. Individuals achieve
results faster. Every major empirical study on arbitration
has found that it produces results faster than litigation.
For individuals who seek recovery, the speed to resolution
may be a valuable advantage of this system of alternative
dispute resolution. By eliminating predispute arbitration,
Congress may worsen access to justice and end up hurting
the very classes of people whom it purports to protect.
For society as a whole, the costs of resolving disputes
without arbitration would rise. Consider the thousands of
disputes currently resolved by arbitration. If those disputes
no longer were arbitrable, where would they go? “To the
courts” is the obvious answer. But any self-respecting lawyer or judge would tell us that the court dockets are already
overburdened. Shuttling these cases out of arbitration simply lengthens the line at the courthouse for everyone.
Some defenders of the Arbitration Fairness Act try
to turn these arguments on their head by arguing that
arbitration deprives plaintiffs of the ability to bring class
actions and thereby deprives those plaintiffs “access
to justice.” There is some surface appeal to this argument, but it ultimately does not support adoption of the
Arbitration Fairness Act. For one thing, the argument
assumes the widespread adoption of class action waivers,
and although some evidence suggests its use in certain
industries (such as the cellular telephone industry), I am
unaware of any systemwide evidence on this point. For
another thing, even assuming the problem is widespread,
the argument further assumes that a large number of cases
exist that would satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23’s exacting standards—again, I am unaware of any
empirical evidence on this point. Finally, even assuming
that these two preceding hurdles can be overcome, the
argument does not support the wholesale invalidation of
arbitration clauses—a more calibrated solution would simply invalidate class action waivers but not the arbitration
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clauses themselves. Organizations such as the American
Arbitration Association have begun to develop extensive
experience administering class arbitrations, and there is
no principled reason why the purported benefits of a class
action cannot also be realized through the mechanism of
an arbitration. Thus, at bottom, the class action argument
is a bit of a ruse—at best it is an argument for the invalidation of class action waivers; at worst, it is self-interested
politicking by class action plaintiffs’ lawyers masquerading
as policy making in the public interest.
Third, defenders of the Arbitration Fairness Act often
argue that postdispute arbitration mitigates these and other
risks of eliminating enforceable agreements. Yet postdispute
arbitration is not a viable alternative to predispute arbitration agreements. One problem is psychological—parties
are simply far more willing to agree on matters before a dispute has arisen; once a dispute arises, the opportunities for
cooperation dwindle. The second problem is structural: the
parties’ incentives in the postdispute context fundamentally differ from the predispute context. Postdispute parties
have more information, which enables them to make more
calculated decisions regarding which form of dispute resolution better promotes their interests or effectively hinders
the individual’s interests. Conversely, in the predispute
context, parties have an incentive to enter into arbitration.
An individual’s incentive is that arbitration is an affordable forum with superior chances for a favorable result. A
company’s incentive is that arbitration can lower the company’s litigation costs.
At bottom, the Arbitration Fairness Act applies a meat
cleaver to an issue that requires a scalpel. The solution is not
for Congress to prohibit predispute arbitration agreements
in employment, consumer, and franchise contracts. Instead,
Congress should encourage and await additional empirical
research. Research may show minor additions to the regulatory repertoire are necessary. However, wholesale, retroactive elimination of predispute arbitration agreements would
effectively make worse off the individuals whom Congress,
through this legislation, seeks to protect. u
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